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Aesthetics and Ideology in the Development 
of "Character" in Theater 
James R. Hamilton 
What I am going to present to you today is a synoptic version of 
one in a series of investigations I have been conducting. In each I take 
the view that theater history is best undertaken when we see theater 
developing not just alongside of but in connection with religious, 
moral, and political developments in our intellectual and social his­
tory. My philosophical interests are connected with certain tasks con­
fronting anyone who would attempt to write an intellectual history of 
theater. And I thought that I would preface my remarks today with a 
brief introduction concerning theater history and the nature of my 
interests in it. 
Theater is often described as the most social of the arts. This des­
cription could hardly have been uttered until after the mid 1 700's 
when, with the decline of the patronage system, most of the arts had 
begun to be rethought in universal rather than partisan terms. Never­
theless, I believe that theater is peculiarly social; but I also think it is 
not always obvious what that means. What I take it to mean is best 
brought out by first considering what happens in theater as analogous 
to what happens when one hears a joke. With jokes there are three 
possibilities: you may get the point and laugh; you may see the point 
but not find it funny; or you may not see the point at all and, far from 
laughing, find yourself somewhat perplexed. No doubt there are deep 
psychological, maybe even genetic, explanations for the general fact 
that human beings laugh and cats, for example, don't. But to under­
stand what is involved in our getting and laughing at a joke, we need a 
different sort of explanation, one that would emerge when we look at 
what is going on when we do not. And clearly this is often a function 
of our social beliefs and attitudes. Someone who gets but does not 
find funny a joke whose point turns on a racial or a gender slur is 
someone who believes these things are demeaning. And some people 
simply do not think about other human beings in ways that allow 
them even to see the point of such jokes, let alone laugh. Analogously 
some theater may rely on social beliefs and attitudes sufficiently dif­
ferent from yours that, while you may see some point there perhaps, 
you do not "respond" to it, it does not "speak to" you, or you do 
not find it a usatisfying theatrical experience.,,  And some theater may 
rely on shared beliefs and attitudes so remote from yours that you 
simply do not uget it" at all. 
This is a nice analogy. But it also has two obvious failings. On the 
one hand, it actually underemphasizes the depth of theater's 
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involvement in social beliefs and attitudes. After all, even when such 
beliefs and attitudes arc assumed in a theater piece ( part of the con­
vcntiona to be accepted), they arc still much more present to us in 
theater than they arc in jokes because they are embodied and enacted 
(in gesture, dress, stance and movement) before our very eyes. On the 
other hand, the analogy may seem to overemphasize social matters 
because it ignores how much our response to a theater piece may be 
shaped by our knowledge of matters aesthetic, of particularly theatri­
cal traditions. I suspect that it is only infrequently that we can get a 
joke only if we see it as belonging to a tradition of joke-construction. 
(Limericks would be an exception.) But it is often the case that our 
reaction to a theater work is strongly conditioned by expectations that 
arc rooted in our knowledge of the theatrical tradition that it stands in 
(or against). 
Now, since there have been significant changes both in social beliefs 
and attitudes and in the aesthetic traditions of theater we might well 
suppose that a fair amount of theater is no longer accessible to us in 
the way in which it was accessible to its contemporary audiences. So 
there is plenty of work for the writer of an intellectual history of 
theater; s/he is very like someone whose job it is to explain the point 
of jokes that we no longer uget." I think of this historian's task as 
intrinsically important. But our previous reflections suggest a question 
that gives to the task a good deal more than antiquarian interest 
(however intrinsic its importance). For it appears that the writer of 
such a history must ask what the connection is, at particular 
moments, between the social beliefs and attitudes expressed or 
assumed in a theater work and the more nearly aesthetic choices 
which shaped the work and made it work theatrically. 
"But need this be done only in terms of particular moments?" the 
philosopher asks. "ls it not possible to discover what sort of connec­
tion this is - indeed must be - in general? '' My own instincts tell me 
not to follow the philosopher here. Although I am interested in the 
sort of connection this is, I suspect that it is not always the same sort 
of connection at different times. And so, I am conducting a series of 
investigations, a series of probes into that history in an attempt to 
treat these issues directly and for their own sake. What follows is a 
synopsis of the material I am considering in one such probe. 
In Ch. VI of the Poetics Aristotle argued that plot ('mythos') is the 
most essential "part" of the art of tragedy because, as he put it, 
utragedy is not an imitation of men, per se, but of human action and 
life and happiness and misery." And, he went on, uBoth happiness 
and misery consist in a kind of action, and the end of life is some 
action, not some quality." This position follows from three things in 
the Poetics. First there is the idea, articulated in Ch. IV, that imitation 
('mimesis') is not sheer reproduction but a crucial element in learn-
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ing. Second there is the postulate, at the beginning of Ch. II, that 
'1 imitative] artists imitate actings of men . . .  " And third, when one 
looks in the margins, so to speak, and especially at the material on 
'ethos' in Ch. XV, one finds that Aristotle thought there was not 
much to learn about human character-traits Cethoi') because all that 
was already given in the social order which, in turn, he thought of as 
given, as natural. (It is singularly instructive to note that his examples 
of improper presentation of 'ethos' concern women and slaves behav­
ing like men.)  Aristotle defined the presentation of character-traits as 
the showing "that agents are of a certain type" (i.e., social class) by 
"indicating [for each agent] what sort of things he chooses or rejects". 
And his position on the relation of 'ethos' to plot (the arrangement of 
the incidents in the imitation of action) is summed up in these words 
in Ch. VI: "Poets do not, therefore, create action in order to i.mitate 
'ethos'; but 'ethos' is included on account of the action." 
Based on this position, and on his distinctive account of learning as 
the seeing of the universal (some principle) in the particulars, Aristo­
tle went on to advocate the use of fairly specific theatrical conven­
tions. I would like to mention five of these. ( 1 ) He argued that the 
incidents ought to be arranged so that each incident advanced (in a 
necessary or probable step) that single action that gave the plot its 
unity. Correlatively he censure� the "episodic" plot. (2)  He argued 
that the resolution of the plot should emerge through the incidents 
themselves; and therefore the gods should not be brought in to 
achieve this but only to relate incidents "outside the plot" which, 
being all-seeing, only they could know. (3) He argued that plots 
would best achieve the imitative function (of learning) if they pre­
sented an action which at first appeared to be happy (or miserable) 
and then, unexpectedly but also by a necessary or probable advance, 
was revealed really to be miserable (or happy). Plots so constructed 
he called "complex" - and those in which there was no "reversal 
incident" achieving this he called "simple." ( 4)  He argued that events 
which are uirrational or depraved" should not be presented unless 
they were necessary for and actually used in the plot. And (5) he 
argued that, since tragedy as a genre is concerned with horrible deeds, 
deeds that arouse "pity and fear," it is better to present such things as 
being done by an agent who does not know her /his relation to the 
victim. This convention makes possible a recognition-reversal incident 
which best achieves the imitative function (of learning); while the 
other (where the agent does the deed knowingly) is merely repellant 
and spectacular, not capable of arousing pity and fear. 
I mention all this because, about one hundred years before Aristo­
tle articulated it, Euripides was writing and producing a kind of 
theater quite antithetical to that which Aristotle advocated. And, 
apart from two short bits of relatively faint praise (for having his plots 
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end in misfortune, and for the plot of lphegenia at T aura ), Aristotle 
conaiat.endy critirues Euripides for t tmanaging things badly." Indeed 
Euripides managed consistently to violate every one of those five 
recommended conventions we have just reviewed. In the personal and 
political tragedies of the first twenty-two years of his thirty-three-year 
output the plots are episodic (to say the least), the gods are very much 
part of the "action," there are no reversal incidents in the Aristote­
lean sense (but the term "simple" hardly applies to his plots either), 
his agents do and/ or cause horrible deeds knowing full well what and 
to whom they are doing, and Euripides seems to have been quite 
taken with the irrational and the depraved without much concern for 
their function in plot-construction. And the reason for this is not that 
Euripides was a bad playwright who did not understand what worked 
well in theater. Rather it is that he had a different aesthetic for the 
theater. At least until shortly after 4 1 5  B.C. when Iphegenia at Tauris 
was presented and he began writing what we might well call "melo­
dramas" and "tragicomedies," it is •ethos' not plot which is given 
primary emphasis in Euripides' theater. 
Consider his Hippolytw ( 428 B.C. ): From the outset it is obvious 
that the weight of emphasis is not given to the sheer telling of the 
story, with unexpected but necessary or probable reversals, and with 
each incident emerging out of its predecessor( s) in a stepwise advance 
of the story. For the first thing we witness is the goddess Aphrodite, 
alone onstage in the Prologue, telling us the entire story that is to 
come and that she is bringing it all to pass. Where the weight of 
emphasis is actually given in this play is revealed by what is presented 
in the Arst two episodes. The Arst episode presents us with Hippoly­
tus and a chorus of huntsmen celebrating the hunt and worshipping at 
the statue of Artemis. When his servant warns him that it is arrogant 
to refuse to acknowledge Aphrodite, Hippolytus describes himself as 
"cold" towards any "goddess whose power reaches its zenith/when 
the bed's warm and the night's dark." And Hippolytus will remain 
arrogant, cold, chaste and disdainful of sexual passion throughout the 
play. Following a choral passage in which the chorus worries about 
the cause of Phaedra's rumored malady, Phaedra ( Hippolytus' step­
mother) is presented to us in the second episode. Unlike what we see 
of Hippolytus, what we witness of Phaedra from the outset is a per5on 
torn by conflicting impulses. When she first appears to us she is dis­
tracted about her clothes and her hair (nothing fits or looks right); 
then she expresses wild desire for the hunt; and Anally she wakes up, 
so to speak, and is shamed by her own wild talk. And Euripides is 
careful to keep these conflicting traits in the focal point right though 
the long second half of the episode during which Phaedra confesses 
her love for Hippolytus to her Nurse. On the one hand, there is 
Phaedra as she once was and still would be, honorable and above all 
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reasonable. On the other, there is Phaedra as she now is, driven by 
desire. Her irrationality both indicates and describes this conflict. 
And, since Aphrodite has told us in the Prologue that she has sent 
this passion on Phaedra as the device by which she will make Hippol­
yros pay for refusing to worship her, we might say that Euripides has 
man.aged things very well indeed if his theater is what we might call 
the "theater of character-tTaits." 
That kind of theater (which I believe continued to exist at least 
through Racine) features (a) an initial presentation of agents with 
dearly scribed character-traits and no subsequent character devdop­
ment or unveiling, together with (b) a presentation of an impossible 
situation for agents with such traits, then (c) an 'action' of the play 
that is really only the playing out of the outcome. And it is especially 
noteworthy that, in that theater, when agents are presented with 
divided impulses (as Euripides' Phaedra is) this is all "on the surface." 
That is, there is no presentation of ostensible, surface, impulses mask­
ing a real and explanatory impulse underneath; nor is the surface div­
ision of impulse presented as a symptom of underlying psychological 
factors. (This is part of what I meant about the absence of what we 
call "character development" or "unveiling".) But while these three 
features remain constant, the history of this kind of theater reveals an 
important set of variables. And the handling of those variables and of 
their interaction with these more constant features strongly suggest 
differences which are not purely aesthetic but are deeply involved in 
ma�ers of ideology. The particular aesthetic variations, are: ( d) that 
Euripides' plot-construction is "episodic," but that there is a move­
ment in Seneca and Racine towards ever more "rationalized" plot­
construction (towards a plot-construction that resembles that advo­
cated by Aristotle); ( e) that Euripides, Seneca, and Racine each make 
quite different use of moments when agents may be brought into con­
frontation; and ( f) that, while Euripides and Seneca portray the out­
come on a fidd of action which is open, public and exterior, Racine 
(especially in his Plv;iedra) portrays the outcome as primarily occur­
ring and located within the central tragic agent. 
Let us look at these aesthetic variations in some detail. First, Euri­
pides' Hippolytus. Overall the plot appears not just "episodic" but 
divided in two. The first half concerns Hippolytus and Phaedra and 
has Phaedra commiting suicide right at the halfway mark, even before 
Theseus arrives; and the second half is entirely taken up with Hippol­
ytus and Theseus. And what integrates these two stories is a pure con­
trivance - Phaedra, rejected by Hippolytus, writes out an accusation 
that Hippolytus has raped her on a tablet that she then holds in her 
hand while hanging herselfl Then too there is that other contrivance 
of having the Nurse mention a magical medicine at the end of the 
third episode: for it to work they need a thread from Hippolytus' 
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clothing or a piece of hair, etc .  The use of this moment seems simply 
to give Euripides an excuse to send the Nurse "inside" to speak with 
Hippolytua; and this, in turn, allows Euripides to have the Nurse 
"spill the beans" to Hippolytus (much to the surprise and consterna­
tion of the listening Phaedra) in the fourth episode. From the point of 
view of Aristotelean rational plotting, it is simply perplexing that Eur­
ipides did not create a plausible reason for having Phaedra and HiJY 
polytus meet and confront each other. Which brings us to the next 
point, the absence of a confrontation between Hippolytus and 
Phaedra. In that fourth episode, Phaedra overhears Hippolytus berat­
ing the Nurse offstage and then, when they do appear on stage, she 
continues just to stand there isolated while Hippolytus denounces her 
and the Nurse (indeed all women and sexual passion). She does not 
speak until he has left, and then only to drive out the Nurse and to 
steel herself for committing suicide and (falsely) accusing Hippolytus. 
Now, Euripides is capable of striking confrontation scenes - in this 
play there arc argumentative confrontations between Hippolytus and 
the servant, Phaedra and the Nurse, Hippolytus and his father, The­
seus. But here, just where we might expect one, he seems deliberately 
to have avoided it. 
Seneca handled this material quite differently in his Phaedra (c.55 
A.O.). His Phaedra confesses her love for Hippolytus to his face. 
Then, when Hippolytus rejects her and threatens to kill her, she begs 
for death at his hands - his response is to cast aside his sword in dis­
dain. But, while Seneca adds this scene of confrontation between 
Hippolytus and Phaedra, he deletes the scene in which Theseus 
accuses Hippolytus and Hippolytus attempts to defend himself. Thus 
he handles the possibilities for confrontation quite differently. He also 
rationalized the plot. For example, Seneca adds the tale that Theseus is 
absent in search of illicit sex. This provides an opportunity, in the 
opening presentation of traits, for his Phaedra to display irrationality: 
she will resent Theseus' wayward lust and not see it as parallel to her 
own passion for Hippolytus, and she will unreasonably deduce from 
the fact that Thesus' adventure is in the underworld that he is dead. 
But this latter irrationality also does work in the plot by making it 
plausible that Phaedra herself should feel free to confront Hippolytus 
and bend him to her will. And then too there is that device of the 
sword. The magical medicine moment of Euripides' third episode is 
dropped; but the token from Hippolytus is picked up. Phaedra (who 
in this play dies at the end, not in the middle) will show the sword to 
Theseus as proof and identifying sign of her charge against Hippoly .. 
tus. But then, after Theseus has cursed Hippolytus and Hippolytus 
has been killed by the sea-monster, Phaedra will re-enter, bearing the 
sword, exonerate Hippolytus and kill herself upon the sword. 
These changes in the handling of confrontations and plot .. 
construction are also reflected in the manner in which Seneca handles 
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the "constants" - the presentation of the agents' traits, of the situa­
tion, and of the outcome. First, from the outset it is obvious that both 
the explanations for the presence of the traits and of the nature of the 
traits themselves are different. There is no Aphrodite here to tell us 
that Hippolytus is arrogantly and exclusively devoted to Artemis and 
that she has caused Phaedra to fall in love with him. (Nor, for that 
matter, does Artemis appear at the end - as she does in Euripides' 
piece - to promise revenge against one of Aphrodite's favorites.)  
Instead, Seneca's Hippolytus is depicted as a beautiful and chaste 
youth . . .  who happens to hate women (and he is not sure whether this 
is reasonable, instinct, or "causeless madness"). Second, let us notice 
this - Seneca is not much interested in making plain what the reason 
is. There is no scene, nor any other device for allowing Hippolytus' 
hatted of women to emerge with an explanation. That hatred is not 
presented as arrogant, but just as a fact. Strategically it is less a setting 
out of Hippolytus' traits and more a presentation of a part of the 
situation Phaedra confronts. Third, the irrationality of Phaedra's 
response to the situation is not presented as a division between the 
impulse of desire and the impulse to be reasonable; instead her irra­
tionality is presented as being in the nature of the state of desire, a 
state which is constantly contrasted with the calmer, more reasonable, 
Stoic attitude espoused by the Nurse (until the end of Act II) and by 
the Chorus (throughout). The moment with the clothes and hair is, in 
Euripides, our first view of Phaedra - and it prepares us to see 
Phaedra torn between desire and reason. In Seneca, it is used at the 
outset of Act II, after Phaedra has told the Nurse of her love for Hip­
polytus. In that scene it is made explicit that these are royal garments; 
the scene thus symbolizes how irrational Phaedra has already become, 
how far her desire has driven her - she is so far gone that she is 
rejecting her royal duties. And finally, all these factors contribute to a 
rather different technique for presenting the outcome. Euripides' 
technique might well be described this way: first he sets forth both the 
agents' traits (with an explanation of how they have come by them) 
and the situation; and then, by obvious artifice, he simply knocks 
over any impediments to the disaster. Seneca, in contrast, adds "mot­
ivation" by so humanizing the setup of the situation that his agents are 
much more active in bringing about the disaster. 
But there is one variable that Euripides and Seneca treat quite sim­
ilarly - the scene of the disaster, indeed of the playing out towards 
the disaster, is public. Even if Seneca's Phaedra is quilty of something, 
and there is no hint of this in Euripides, still she is objectively quilty; 
her divisions of impulse are not expressions of guilt feelings nor, when 
she finally takes the stoic attitude at the end, does she suffer from feel­
ings of guilt. Racine's Phaedra exhibits both of these, a fact that makes 
his treatment of this material a giant step in the direction 
8
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 15 [2015], No. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol15/iss1/5
86 Jama R. Hamilton 
of the ., theater of character. "  Furthermore, Racine adds not just 
"more human " motivation but specifically more "psychological" 
motivation. 
HU play, like Seneca's, opens with Hippolyrus. But it docs so with 
signficant changes. The hunt theme is dropped; Hippolytus is, instead, 
preparing to leave in search of Theseus. This provides an occasion for 
doubt as to the reasons for Theseus' absence. Hippolytus may be con­
vinced that his father has seen the errors of his wayward youth; but 
that news is greeted skeptically by Hippolytus' confidante, Thera­
menes. However, no sooner is this raised than it gives way to a remar­
kable change in the story. Hippolyrus is ashamed; he is ashamed 
because he has fallen in love with Aricia, who is the "last of a line that 
plotted Theseus' death" and whom Theseus has forbiden any man to 
marry. Indeed, Hippolytus is so ashamed that he cannot fully admit to 
it. This whole scene is pretty remarkable. First we note that, unlike 
our previous plays, doubt about an agent's motives is possible. 
Second, here an agent may express shame without its being either a 
sign of clashing demands of desire versus reason or a sign of the state 
of desire. ln fact, given the rather lighthearted reaction of Thera­
menea, Hippolytus' shame looks like blushing youthful confusion, 
and nothing more. The sub-plot is a romance. But third, the introduc­
tion of this romantic sub-plot allows. Racine to do a very striking 
thing later on. ln Act IV, Scene IV, right after Theseus ( in a reinstated 
but reworked accusation-defense scene) has cursed Hippolytus and 
driven him out, Phaedra comes to plead for Theseus to spare Hippol­
ytus. Theseus tells Phaedra that Hippolytus has tried to clear himself 
by the stratagem of confessing love for Aricia. At that moment, 
Phaedra finally understands Hipplytus' rejection, is instantly jealous, 
and stops herself from saving Hippolytus. Where Seneca had one 
exoneration scene at the end, Racine has two: this first one is arrested 
by the onset of a sudden natural passion, the second one will be moti­
vated by guilt. From the outset, then, and in its working out, Racine's 
Phaedra presents what seems to us a much more natural psychology 
than we find in Euripides' and Seneca's treatments. Doubt, shame, 
jealousy and guilt. 
Nonetheless, this piece is still rooted firmly in the theater of 
character-traits (or at least in its Renaissance avatar, the theater of 
character .. types ) . Each agent is presented to the audience initially just 
as s/he will remain throughout. Their traits are established and, if 
they chance to have a new feeling aroused (as Phaedra's jealous reac .. 
tion shows), that new feeling is not an unveiling of some impulse 
heretofore hidden °underneath" but a natural response given the 
traits the agent already is depicted as having. Once the traits are 
assigned, Racine uses two techniques to take us to the outcome. The 
first is a gradual releasing of information (some of it false) as to the 
9
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situation. In this he is using high artiface, lilce Euripides (except that 
whereas Euripides removed impediments to the outcome, Racine 
withholds the information which leads to it). But it is the second 
rechnique that is most striking. Outdoing Seneca, who used Hippoly­
tuS' and Theseus' character-traits as part of the situation Phacda was 
to confront, Racine's is a theater in which the situation for each of the 
agents is almost totally constituted by the traits of the other agents. 
This is why doubt as to others' traits plays such a dominant role in 
the piece. This is why Racine's treatment, far more than one finds in 
Euripides or Seneca, is a sequence of confrontation scenes between 
the agents. Not sure of each other, they must be brought together 
even if only to make grave errors in their assessments of each other. 
This, in tum, is why Racine's plotting appears even more rationalized 
than Seneca's -- Racine's need to bring two agents together is explica­
ble in terms of their previous doubts. Thus, even though this is still 
an illustration of the theater of character-traits, it exhibits crucial 
ingredients of the theater of character, per se. 
But, before we tum to that, let us look back over this brief survey 
of the theater of character-traits with a view to understanding why 
those convention-choices which are its features should have been 
made. The first question here is why character-traits should have been 
emphasized at all. After all, even if no one ever carried out Aristotle's 
particular progam, it is surely possible to pick out theater (from 
Sophocles through Shakespeare) in which the emphasis is laid on 
conceptions of and problems about human action. The second ques­
tion is why Euripides, Seneca, and Racine would have found natural 
those particular choices which gave to each's theater its distinctive 
shape. 
(Earlier I asserted that here we would be involved in matters of 
ideology. By that word, I am referring to religious, moral and political 
beliefs which are assumed as givens by a people in their understanding 
of their lives but which may not be true at all and certainly are open 
to criticism. And with that in mind, let us tum to the issues directly. )  
At first glance, Euripides' use of episodic structure may seem to us 
to be a purely aesthetic and, moreover, an idiosyncratic cho\ce. And it 
certainly did distinguish his theater from that of his older contempor­
ary, Sophocles. But it is important to note that both Sophocles and 
Euripides were working with and working out assumed beliefs in 
Athenian theology which could be seen to undermine, in a fairly radi­
cal way, that combination of official pietism and emperial militarism 
that was already being employed in Athens' justifications for its war 
with Sparta. But Sophocles (as I believe, despite Aristotle•s rather dif­
ferent assessment) was probing beliefs about the metaphysical instabil­
ity of human action and, hence, the lack of authority for it as well. 
And he made no explicit connection between that theological strain 
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and the intrinsic evils of militarism until his last play , Oedipus at 
Colonw ( 406 BC). Moreover, Sophocles' view on the instability of life 
and action was a two-edged sword; Thucydides ( if we can believe 
him) describes the Athencans taking the very same position in their 
argument in 4 1 5  ( with the leaders of Melos) in support of the legiti­
macy of sheer military power. Euripides' choice to emphasize 'ethos', 
and thua to use episodic structure so as to de-emphasize interest in 
plot and action, represents a rather different strategy, one indeed 
which turned out to be immune to having another face put on it. Eur­
ipides teased out a thread in Athenean theology which had it that each 
of the gods was to be served in his/her own coin. And, while most 
Atheneana may well have believed one could quite reasonably serve 
all the gods, Euripides took the 0own coin" idea literally and showed 
that it led to obsession and unreasoning folly. But folly, furthermore, 
requires victima. And this, I think, explains the absence of confronta­
tion between Hippolytus and Phaedra. In his other confrontation 
scenes we are invited to see one agent in a better light than the other 
(although it may not be the ostensible winner of the argument). But 
Phaedra and Hippolytus are both portrayed as victims, each in her/his 
own way and part of the play. Euripides' choice avoids having us see 
one aa more or less a victim than the other. 
Thia overall strategy of connecting this theological belief with disas­
trous folly was clearly applied to Athenean militarism in Euripides' 
political tragedies (between 4 28 and 4 1 5  ). And that, together with his 
general sophistic skepticism, was to get Euripides into such political 
"hot water" that (even though he had already given up writing this 
kind of tragedy) he was forced to leave Athens around 408 BC. 
Of course, once you know it's there, it is easy to see how the social­
religous dimension informs Euripides' aesthetic choices. It is even eas­
ier to see this phenomenon in Seneca's theater. Seneca was perhaps 
better known in Europe, until well after the French Revolution, out­
side of theater and for his writings in Stoicism. Moreover, Seneca 
wrote in that period just before Stoicism made its inward turn and 
gave up its political program of egalitarian reform. The central ethical 
notion in stoicism is uobedience to nature." As a political ethic Stoic­
ism held that citizens ought to obey the state because the existence of 
states is unatural," and that a state ought to treat its citizens fairly and 
equally because each citizen is a "natural" agent in her/his own 
regard. As a personal ethic Stoicism held that one should attempt to 
alter only what is in one's natural power to change; and, since one's 
circumstances (wealth, fame, or honor) are usually a function of the 
reaction of others to one (not, therefore, in one's own power to 
change) this usually meant that right-living was a matter of adusting 
one's attitude towards acceptance of circumstance. With this in mind, 
I think we can see why Seneca was attracted to Euripides' plays and 
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why he reshaped the Euripidean material as he did. 
On the one hand there are those obsessed irrational agents in Euri­
pides' plays - just the sort of foils against which one could place 
another, a Stoic, conception of right-living. And, since Stoic life is a 
matter of choosing attitudes before actions, Euripides' theater was a 
far better model than was Sophocles'.  On the other hand, the Athe-­
nean theological-political complex that Euripides exploited was alien 
to Seneca; and so too was the picture of obsessed agents as victims 
(however much they commited acts of folly). Therefore the gods were 
written out and the situation made more concretely human. The plots 
got rationalized, the moviation "humanized." This also explains why 
Seneca would add the confrontation between Phaedra and Hippoly­
tuS: it is done precisely to invite a comparative assessment between 
Phaedra and that part of her circumstance comprised by the traits of 
Hippolytus, something not in her power. The accusation-defense 
scene is dropped because Theseus and Hippolytus are both used as 
aspects of Phaedra's situation; and thus for Seneca the scene would be 
pointless. Finally we should also note that Euripides' strategy of tak­
ing the theology obsessively allows no room for choice once the situa­
tion is set up. Seneca's theater constantly leaves open the Stoic alter­
native even though here, in his Phaedra, it is not constantly advocated 
by some agent in the play. (This feature, by the way, emphasized the 
difficulty of the Stoic alternative, and of Phaedra's final correct cho­
ice; and it is what makes Seneca's Phadra quite different from his 
r�haping of the Medea, a play that is almost pure polemic for 
Stoicism.) 
While a social-political aspect in Seneca's theater is obvious, it is 
far less so in Racine's. Of course, there are obvious political preoccu­
pations in Racine's Phaedra. The Nurse's attempt to persuade Phaedra 
to think of the political fate and prospects of her children occurs but 
once in Euripides' play; and only a little more is made of this in Sene­
ca's. In Racine's it is a major element in the situation and is set up 
from the outset in the Aricia subplot. At issue is who will succeed 
Theseus if he really is dead: Aricia, Hippolytus, or Phaedra's oldest 
son. But while this question is used to tum the plot in several impor­
tant places, this obvious reflection of 1 7th century French political 
life does not seem to be connected with those aesthetic features that 
distinguish Racine's theater of character-traits from those we have 
seen before. Instead, the extensive use of confrontations to resolve 
and to occasion mistaken assessments of traits, the use of agents with 
certain traits as constitutive of the situation that other agents face, and 
the emphasis on Phaedra's feelings (especially the picture of suffering 
as primarily mental anguish) are more certainly connected with that 
less obvious but equally powerful set of ideological assumptions con­
cerning the status of the individual in the religious, metaphysical, 
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moral, psychological and political thought of the 1 7 th century. 
Consider Descartes for starters. His Meditatioru, for all its skepti, 
dam in the opening, is still a defense (albeit circuitous ) of the rational 
foundations of empirical science. That such a defense was desperately 
need  is clear - the Meditations were published in 1 64  2 ,  one year 
after Galileo was forced to recant for the third time and then died. 
But what is just as striking about the Me.ditatioru, from an ideologial 
point of view, is that it seemed natural to Descartes to have grounded 
epistemological certainty in the mind and that, not of God, but of a 
human individual! This is not unconnected with the fact that Machia, 
vel1i 's earlier picture ( 1 53 1 )  of right political action as the exercise of 
the will ('virtu') was taken, in the political thought of the 1 7th cen, 
tury, to mean that political authority was legitimated by and a func, 
tion of the traits of a powerful individual. Nor is this unconnected 
with the central role of the individual in establishing religious doctri, 
nal authority, an clement present both in the Reformation theologies 
and in the Jansenist movement within Roman Catholicism. (And 
Racine was once and then later a Jansenist.) Nor is all this uncon, 
nected with the political and economic aspirations of the rising hour, 
gcoiac class in nations or emerging nations whose political and ecO' 
nomic forms (especially the tax structures) were still based on late 
feudal models. The "individual" as the source of all authority had 
been conceived and was a,boming (if not already born) when Racine 
produced his Phaedra in 1677 .  
Once our attention is focused in this direction, the distinctive aes, 
thetic choices in Racine's theater seem very natural choices indeed. 
The situation an agent faces is, in this ideology, largely comprised of 
the traits of other agents. But since in this conception (at least after 
Descartes) the individual's mind is logically isolate and knowable only 
through the individual's "outer" behavior, there is room for an agent 
to make mistakes, possibly tragic mistakes, as to the traits another 
agent actually possesses and is exhibiting. And this is pretty interest, 
ing stuff to make dreams on. Indeed, when one does, it will also be 
natural to set the tragic action of the play in the mind of the central 
tragic agent. So Phaedra's suffering at the end is mental anguish, guilt. 
And her mode of physical dying, which no doubt is also a solution in 
a theater that raised aesthetic and moral objections to onstage viO' 
lence, is still marvelously in keeping with the focus on the inner, is°' 
late, individual - Racine's Phaedra poisons herself and dies from the 
poison working inside her, onstage. 
Now, in retrospect, there is an obvious contradiction between this 
conception of "the individual" and the theater of character,traits. ln 
fact there are several. First, if an individual is a logically isolate mind, 
(a) is it really possible to know another individual, and (b) can one 
honestly present an individual as knowable to the audience? The full 
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implications of this problem lav dormant in the tradition until this 
century. What was clearly seen, not long after Racine, was at least that 
one could not present an individual as lcnowable by her/ his tTaits. 
Whatever general psychological laws might be discovered, in the 
ideology of individualism it seems false to draw agents in plays as 
types. And, as this view gets worlced out in theater, the presentation of 
who a person is talces place in scenes revealing and/ or relying on the 
particular psychological history of the individual. But let me note two 
historical facts. ( 1 ) These developments occurred gradually. Slowly, 
conventions of scribing the traits of agents gave way to conventions 
for displaying agents' eccentricities; and they, in tum, gave way to 
conventions for developing and unveiling "character" (a term that 
was first used in English in this way by Henry Fielding in the mid-
1700s ). (2) These developments took place largely in the background; 
for most theater between Racine and the mid- 1800s emphasized 
action, or morals and manners, or reasoning and rhetoric rather than 
conceptions of and issues about motivation. But with Naturalism and 
Realism motivation was once more placed at center stage. And when 
it was, we discover, another contradiction within the ideology of indi­
vidualism had already been sufficiently mapped out that the presenta­
tion of the contradiction itself was a convention of the new theater. 
Interestingly, the convention and the contradiction are prefigured in 
Act Ill, Scene I, of Racine's Phaedra. At the conclusion of Act II, 
Hippolytus rejects Phaedra. She has confessed her love; and he, once 
he .does begin to understand what she is saying and suggesting, 
becomes deeply embarrassed and ashamed. Act Ill opens with 
Phaedra refusing to put on royal dress, seeing herself. as shamed, 
unreasoning, and above all self-deceiving. And then, in the very same 
scene, she turns right round and deceives herself into thinking she has 
a chance with Hippolytus! Of course the mistakes she makes here are 
pure Racine. She mistakes his embarrassment for youthful shyness 
and confusion. She mistakenly reasons that, since she has no rivals, 
the field is clear. And this second mistalce, when corrected, gives rise 
to the jealous reaction that cost Hippolytus his life. But note this: the 
reason she thinks she has no rivals is that Hippolytus is "known" to 
hate all women! This is not Seneca's Phaedra who deludes herself into 
thinking Theseus is dead when she ought to know better. Racine's 
Phaedra deludes herself when she does know better (even though what 
she "knows" is actually false). 
Consider: if the individual is logically isolate, and if the way one 
knows an idividual is by observing her/his "outer" behavior, how 
does one know one's selfl Descartes argued that this was immediate 
knowledge, and certain. But as soon as the question is posed, the issue 
is opened and no cozy answer seems to do. Indeed it becomes a cru­
cial problem in the ideology of individualism (right up through Freud 
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and beyond) to give some satisfactory account of the phenomenon of 
eelf-deception ao that we may have a coherent account of self­
knowledge. And it may well be quite impossible to do so. But before 
that ugly thought wu to rear its head in the theater, self-deception 
wu thought to be merely symptomatic of something deeper and hid­
den but still acuaaiblc, if one knew how and where to look. And so 
the 1eene of self-deception became stock-in-trade in the theater of 
character. lbaen, Checkov, Zola. 
Whereas generally in Racine, agents' mistakes are mistakes about 
traits that are clearly and obviously there (the audience sees them ), in 
Naturalilm and Realism such mistakes (about others and oneself) are 
part of the human condition because what really is there is masked, 
hidden, or unclear from surface inspection. And since the real 
impulaea are hidden they may also erupt to the surface in surprising 
and di.autrous ways. It matters not whether these impulses are con­
ceived of in psychological, genetic, or social Darwinian terms, the 
convention-choices ( the strategies of presentation) that give the 
theater of character its distinctive aesthetic are rooted in the develop­
ing and increasingly fragmented ideology of individualism. 
What happens next will have to wait for another investigation. 
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